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Abstract 
In this paper, we consider the short and long-run performance of UK firms following 
foreign acquisitions. Based on a near-exhaustive sample of significant foreign 
acquisitions by UK companies over the period 1985-1994, we show that short-run 
returns are insignificantly different from zero irrespective of the location of the 
acquisition. Further analysis reveals that the distribution of the event period returns is 
determined by changes in the exchange rate, the presence of the acquiring firm in the 
target country and by US tax reforms. While long-run returns are not significantly 
different from zero on average, they show considerable variation by region. 
Specifically, firms under-perform following acquisition in the US, show insignificant 
returns following acquisitions in the EU and acquisitions elsewhere show significant 
positive returns. Examination of the distribution of these returns suggest that, in 
accordance with the ownership-location-internalisation hypothesis of FDI, long-run 
performance is more likely to depend on the firm-specific advantages such as R&D.  
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Foreign Acquisitions by UK Limited Companies: Short and Long-
Run Performance 
 
1. Introduction 
A key feature of the world economy since the mid-1960s has been the remarkable 
growth of foreign direct investment (FDI). The growth of FDI has out-stripped the 
growth of income four-fold and trade three-fold. The growth in FDI has been 
particularly marked since the mid-1980s with the world economy witnessing a 
dramatic surge such that FDI has become the most common means of serving foreign 
markets. Indeed, in terms of the recent focus on ‘globalisation’, ‘globalisation of 
production’ now exceeds ‘globalisation through trade’. Furthermore, this growth of 
FDI has involved most developed countries. For example, the US witnessed a surge in 
both FDI outflows and inflows with the latter increasing so rapidly that the US 
became a net importer of FDI in the late 1980s. In the case of the EU, FDI both within 
the EU and between EU and non-EU countries increased rapidly. The main exception 
to the simultaneous growth of FDI involving developed countries relates to Japan 
which witnessed considerable growth in FDI outflows while FDI inflows into Japan 
remained at low levels. 
 
A key characteristic of the dramatic growth in FDI since the mid-1980s is the form it 
has taken. FDI can take a variety of forms including the establishment of ‘green-field’ 
sites and joint ventures. However, the most prevalent form of FDI is via cross-border 
acquisitions. For example, in the US, on average over the 1984-1995 period, cross-
border acquisitions accounted for over 90 per cent of US FDI inflows. In the EU, 
cross-border acquisitions have also dominated FDI flows involving both EU and non-
EU countries. For the UK, cross-border acquisitions also account for the main form of 
FDI. For example, in 1998, cross-border acquisitions accounted for around 80 per 
cent of FDI outflows1. Moreover, cross-border acquisitions have risen markedly in 
recent years: in 1995, the value of acquisition purchases by the UK was almost $30m 
but by 1999 this had risen to $209m. For developed countries as a whole, cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions grew from around $173m in 1995 to $677m in 1999. While 
                                                          
1 This data comes from World Investment report 2000: Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions and 
Development, UNCTAD (2000). 
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there may be some variation between countries, industries and years, the dominance 
of cross-border acquisitions is such that we can relate the surge of FDI since the mid-
1980s as being synonymous with a surge in international acquisitions. 
 
The aim of this paper is to consider the short and long-run performance of UK firms 
which made acquisitions during the 1984-1994 period.  Since the UK is a leading 
player in international acquisitions, the study of UK acquisitions abroad is an 
important aspect in determining the overall success of FDI by acquisition. For 
example, Healy and Palepu (1993) note that, over the late 1980s, the UK was the lead 
acquiring nation in international acquisitions accounting for almost 30 per cent of 
international corporate investments over that period. As an acquirer nation, the US 
accounted for around 14 per cent of total acquisitions over the same period2. The 
focus on the UK departs from most recent studies that look at either the US or Japan 
as the source of acquiring firms or, more commonly, with the US as host with the 
returns to bidding firms varying across the source countries. 
 
Although some (albeit limited) research on the returns to shareholders of bidding 
firms involved in international acquisitions exists, we depart from this literature in 
several important respects.   The first, for the reasons explained above, is in the focus 
of attention being the UK on which the literature is fairly scant. The second is the 
comparison between short and long-run abnormal returns with most studies to date 
focussing solely on announcement period effects. Third, while we apply standard 
event study methodology to derive the announcement period effects, to our 
knowledge, this is the first study of FDI decisions that employs the Lyon et al (1999) 
“bootstrapping” method in testing for long-run abnormal returns. Moreover, we relate 
these results to the literature on foreign direct investment in order to explain the 
distribution of returns across the acquiring firms that comprise our sample. 
 
Most recent studies have focussed on the effect of the acquisition around the event 
(acquisition) date. However, positive abnormal returns (if they exist) may dissipate 
                                                          
2 This ranking obviously varies each year depending on country and firm specific determinants of FDI. 
For example, in 1996, the UK accounted for 16 per cent of cross-border acquisitions world-wide while 
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over the long-run. This has been the focus of recent research in the finance literature 
which suggests that the announcement period returns may not fully reflect the wealth 
effect of an event3.  This may be true of cross-border acquisitions particularly if the 
acquisition, and the premium paid, is influenced by short-run factors such as the 
presence of multiple bidders in a given acquisition, a given level of the exchange rate, 
changes in legislation, or the perception of increased protectionism (e.g. the creation 
of  
the ‘Single Market’ in the EU). For example, recent studies focussing on 
shareholders’ wealth in target firms following cross-border acquisitions (around the 
event date) have highlighted the role of the US dollar and changes in US tax laws (see 
below). While this may influence the returns around the acquisition date, it may not 
reflect the wealth effect of the acquisition over the long-run. There is an extensive 
literature that documents the long-run under-performance of domestic acquirers, 
which is major issue in explaining the rationality of merger activity by firms (for a 
review of this literature, see Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000).  Therefore in this paper we 
also pay special attention to the long-run performance of UK acquiring firms, which 
may differ from the abnormal returns associated with the acquisition event.  
Significantly, we provide evidence on specific acquirer characteristics that appear to 
be associated with long-run post-bid performance and show that these are in line with 
predictions drawn from the ownership-location-internalisation theory of FDI. 
 
Our (near exhaustive) sample of significant acquisitions by UK acquiring firms allows 
us to assess whether there is any variation in performance in the nature of UK 
acquisitions abroad. Whilst the results show that foreign takeovers by UK firms 
produce returns that are, on average, negative but insignificantly different from zero 
in both the short and long-run, digging deeper into the data reveals important 
differences in acquirer performance that reflect both target market and acquirer-
specific differences.  Specifically, there is variation in abnormal returns depending on 
country of acquisition and on the period in which returns are measured. Sub-analysis 
shows that acquisitions in the US produce returns in the short-run that are positive but 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the US accounted for 31 per cent in the same year. However, in 1999, the UK accounted for around 30 
per cent of acquisition purchases world-wide and the US 16 per cent. For data, see UNCTAD (2000). 
3 See, for example, Loughran and Vijh (1997).   
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not significantly different from zero; however, over the long-run, returns following 
acquisitions in the US are both economically and statistically significantly negative.  
Negative abnormal returns exceed 27% over the 5 years post-takeover.  By contrast, 
EU takeovers yield insignificantly negative returns around the acquisition event 
though they exhibit positive abnormal returns over a 5-year period though they are 
still not significantly different from zero. With reference to the relatively small 
sample of takeovers (39 acquisitions) in the rest of the world, they produce positive 
returns in the short-run though they are not significantly different from zero; however, 
in the long-run, these acquisitions in the rest of the world produce significantly 
positive abnormal returns.  Partitioning results on degree of relatedness shows that 
abnormal returns in same-SIC takeovers are an insignificant –3.6% after 5 years, 
whilst conglomerate (different principal SIC code) takeovers yield a significant –
21.8% abnormal return over the same period.  However, both same SIC and 
conglomerate takeovers yield significant negative abnormal returns within the US. 
This partitioning of the sample by industry relatedness does not seem to influence 
returns around the event date. 
 
 Finally, our regression tests show that the determinants of event period returns are 
more likely to be associated with short-run factors such as policy changes (the US tax 
reforms in the mid-1980s) and the exchange rate but these factors are of little 
significance in explaining long-run performance. In terms of regression tests of the 
long-run performance, firm-specific advantages in the form of R&D are the most 
important factor in explaining why some firms do better than others. Our results also 
confirm that US acquisitions are value-reducing events, but also provide evidence that 
R&D and the presence of a hostile bidder have a role to play in explaining abnormal 
returns over a 5-year period.  Overall, the results show that the returns around the 
event date can differ both economically and statistically from long-run returns and the 
factors that determine the performance over a given period can also vary. As such, the 
difference between the event period and long-term abnormal returns and the factors 
that appear to cause them may be a source of concern given that what determines the 
long-run performance post-acquisition will be quite different from what will 
determine returns in the short-run. This would suggest that the market does not 
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appropriately characterise what will determine shareholder wealth just by looking at 
the event period returns. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we present a brief review of the 
literature on wealth effects on bidding firms involved in cross-border acquisitions and 
how this has been related to the literature on foreign direct investment. In section 3, 
we discuss the data that forms the basis of the sample used to assess the performance 
of UK firms while, in section 4, we present the research method. In section 5, the 
results are reported while in section 6 we report the principal conclusions and what 
the results may infer about the post-acquisition performance of UK firms. 
 
2. Related Literature  
(a) Post-Acquisition Performance of Acquiring Firms 
While cross-border acquisitions have received some attention in the finance literature 
(most commonly on the impact on the target firm) only a limited body of research 
exists on the impact of cross-border acquisitions on returns of acquiring firms. For 
example, Doukas and Travlos (1988) focus on US acquiring firms and find that, on 
average, there is no significant impact on bidders’ wealth. However, there is 
considerable variation over their sample of firms with positive abnormal returns 
arising if the acquiring firm is entering new markets or new industries. The authors 
regard this evidence as supporting the multinational network hypothesis, the rationale 
here being that there are lower (higher) marginal returns if the acquiring firm already 
has (does not have) a presence in the target country. Other studies that have focussed 
on returns to bidders based on a sample of US firms include Fatemi and Furtedo 
(1998), Markides and Ittner (1994) and Datta and Puia (1995) all of which find either 
non-significant positive abnormal returns or, in the case of Datta and Puia, negative 
abnormal returns. In terms of non-US countries, Kang (1993) investigates the 
abnormal returns of Japanese bidders in the US and finds positive abnormal returns to 
Japanese firms. Corhay and Rad (2000) find weak evidence that cross-border 
acquisitions are wealth-creating based on a sample of Dutch firms. They also find 
evidence that the benefits from internalisation are greater for firms having less 
international exposure and making acquisitions outside their main industrial activity. 
In terms of cross-country comparisons, Eun et al. (1996) have shown that the returns 
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to acquiring firms are likely to vary across countries. Examining cross-border 
acquisitions in the US, they show that bidding firms sourced from Japan experienced 
positive abnormal returns while UK firms experienced considerable negative 
abnormal returns. Acquiring firms based in Canada experienced mildly positive 
abnormal returns that were considerably below those experienced by Japanese firms4. 
Cakici et al. (1996) also report significantly positive abnormal returns around the 
event date for acquirers from Japan, Australia, the UK and the Netherlands.  
 
These studies suggest that positive abnormal returns are likely to vary depending 
upon the characteristics of the investing firms, the country of origin, and the country 
and/or industry in which the acquiring firm is investing in. However, all these studies 
are linked by a similar characteristic i.e. they all measure the impact on the acquiring 
firm around the date of the acquisition event. In this paper, the focus is extended to 
evaluate the returns of the acquiring firm over the long-run as short-run event studies 
may not fully reflect the wealth creating or destroying impact of an acquisition and 
that a measured positive/negative impact (if any) may be determined by factors 
corresponding with the event date. Such an extension is particularly relevant if the 
acquisition is intended to be value-creating (say, through synergy). Clearly, aside 
from the immediate impact of the acquisition event, identifying the long-run 
performance of international acquisitions is important in assessing the overall impact 
of FDI.  The only other paper to look at longer run returns for this group of acquirers 
is that of Conn  et al. (2001)5.  That paper uses a control firm approach, with 
matching on size and prior performance, with significance measured by standard t-
tests and the Wilcoxson matched pair signed rank tests, in contrast to the Lyon et al. 
method we describe below.  The sample period and returns accumulation period are 
also different with returns being accumulated up to 36 months post-takeover.6  
However, results are broadly similar between the two studies, with the exception that 
we find stronger negative returns for the US sample.  The most likely explanation for 
this difference is the deterioration in performance between the 36 and 60-month 
horizons, which we describe below. Moreover, we also formally test for the 
                                                          
4 Conn and Connell (1990) compared the returns of US and UK bidding firms. 
5 Moeller et al. (2003) have recently explored the issue of short and long-run returns using a sample 
consisting of US firms involved in domestic acquisitions. 
6 Less for later periods in the sample 
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determinants of performance following foreign acquisitions over both the short and 
long-run periods. 
 
(b) Relating Performance to Determinants of FDI 
There are two broad themes that have emerged in the economics literature on the  
rationale for foreign investment and that have been reflected in the finance literature 
on the returns of acquiring firms following cross-border acquisitions. The economics 
literature on foreign direct investment places emphasis on the ownership-location-
internalisation (OLI) paradigm which suggests a combination of factors would lead to 
an incentive for invest overseas.7 In broad terms, firms engage in FDI due to the 
possession of substantial intangible assets (ownership) related to which there are 
difficulties in exploiting such assets through alternative means due to market failure 
(internalisation), the role of product or factor market imperfections also being noted 
by Harris and Ravenscraft (1991).  Typically these intangible assets are measured as 
R&D as a percentage of sales. The location aspect of the OLI paradigm stresses 
advantages of FDI in specific countries/regions in combination with firm-specific 
ownership factors and the problems of internalisation.   These issues have been 
highlighted in the finance literature on overseas takeovers. For example, Mork and 
Yeung (1992) have highlighted the relevance of the OLI framework in an event study 
of US acquisitions. Specifically they report positive abnormal returns for US firms 
from international acquisitions if the acquiring firm possesses firm-specific intangible 
assets as reflected in high levels of R&D expenditure and/or advertising expenditure, 
the possession of these assets being most commonly associated with the 
characteristics of firms likely to invest abroad as outlined in the traditional literature 
on FDI. In contrast, Cakici et al. (op. cit.) find no role for R&D in determining event 
period returns.  
 
Another theme in the literature on foreign direct investment has related to the role of 
capital market imperfections and the role of exchange rates commonly associated with 
Froot and Stein (1991). They have hypothesised that foreign buyers will have a 
comparative advantage in buying a domestic company when the foreign currency is 
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relatively strong. In essence, an appreciation of the acquiring country’s currency 
should increase the relative wealth of the acquiring firms which allows firms to 
overcome capital market constraints and hence increase acquisitions. A different 
variant of the exchange rate argument is provided by Blonigen (1997) who argues that 
changes in the exchange rate leads to a change in the valuation of the expected stream 
of returns from an asset acquired in a foreign country.  
 
While these papers essentially focussed on explaining the rise foreign acquisitions in 
the US around the late 1980s, others have focussed on US tax reforms that occurred in 
1986. Important in this regard is the US Tax Reform Act of 1986, which Scholes and 
Wolfson (1990) argue helped the relative position of foreign investors compared to 
the position for foreign buyers under the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act. The 
issue here was that the US Economic Recovery Tax Reform Act of 1981 increased tax 
incentives for domestic takeovers which allowed rapid depreciation write off and 
investment tax credits. The 1986 Tax Reform Act reversed these incentives and thus, 
it is argued, would have lead to more foreign acquisitions of US companies. More 
specifically, the Scholes and Wolfson argument should be reflected in more 
acquisitions by foreign companies in the US particularly from countries that apply the 
world-wide principle for taxing profits earned abroad8.  
 
The finance literature has also reflected these themes in the literature in order to 
explain returns around the event date. For example, Swenson (1993) and Dewenter 
(1995a) have found the role of the exchange rate to be a significant factor in 
determining returns to target firms while Dewenter (1995b) finds some evidence for 
the role of tax reform changes though the evidence is rather weak. Kang (op. cit.) 
reports evidence that the gains to Japanese acquirers is positively related to the 
weakness of the US dollar. In contrast, Cakici et al. (op. cit.) find no role for the 
exchange rate or the impact of US tax reforms in explaining the returns to acquirers of 
US firms. Rather Cakici et al. find that the gains to the acquirers are more likely to be 
affected by the presence of hostile bidders. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7 For a summary of internalisation theory, see for example, Dunning (1993).  
8  The world-wide principle involves the taxation of profits earned world-wide but grants credits on 
foreign taxes paid. The UK and Japan would fall into this category.   
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 (c) Further Considerations 
Several studies of cross-border acquisitions have highlighted the variation in the gains 
across acquiring countries. This is noted in the studies by Eun et al. (op. cit) and 
Cakici et al. (op. cit.) though there is often little rationalisation as to why cross-
country variation in post-acquisition performance should exist. Corhay and Rad (op. 
cit.) also note cross-country variation in returns but justify their segmentation of the 
data on the basis that corporate governance varies between countries with, for 
example, the EU having different legal and institutional regulations compared with 
the US which may influence the cross-country distribution of foreign acquisitions. 
This fits with recent work on how corporate governance varies between countries. 
Most notable in this regard are the recent papers by La Porta et al. (2000, 2001). They 
note that there is significant variance in the characteristics of corporate governance 
throughout the world and that this varies with the nature of the legal system in 
countries that comprise their sample. Most notable for our purposes is that the UK has 
a very similar corporate governance structure to that of the US, both of which are 
based on common law. In contrast, many European countries have different corporate 
governance structures reflected in concentration of ownership, shareholders’ rights 
and so on. As noted by La Porta et al., the legal system in many European countries is 
based on civil law. Recently, Rossi and Volpin (2003) have related this variation in 
the characteristics of corporate governance to the cross-country determinants of cross-
border acquisitions. They argue that the role of corporate governance on value-
enhancing acquisitions is ambiguous. On the one hand, acquisitions from high to low 
investor protection countries may lead to higher  premiums reflecting the anticipated 
gains in efficiency as stronger corporate governance standards extend over firms with 
weaker standards. Alternatively, lower demand for acquisition deals in countries with 
lower standards would lead to lower premiums. In terms of UK acquisitions in the US 
which (where according to the data reported by La Porta et al. (2001) the US and the 
UK have similar corporate governance structures), the premium may reflect 
competition among bidders though this is likely to interact with other control 
variables such as the exchange rate and the US Tax Reform Act which will influence 
the relative competitiveness of foreign versus domestic acquirers of US firms. While 
these variables would have reduced the competitiveness of domestic versus overseas 
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bidders, it would have increased competition among foreign acquirers for US targets. 
More generally, Rossi and Volpin conclude that variation in corporate governance is 
an important influence on the distribution of cross-border deals and the premiums 
associated with such acquisitions. 
 
Reflecting this recent literature we also segment our sample by target country. Most 
importantly, we separate out the experience of UK firms acquiring companies in the 
US and the EU. The US sub-sample is justified on the basis that it has a similar legal 
system to that of the US with many of aspects of corporate governance being similar 
between the US and UK. Acquisitions in the US also form the majority of targets in 
our sample. The EU forms another sub-sample. The argument for treating the EU as a 
block is based not solely on the policy changes associated with the creation of a larger 
market and the Single Market Programme but also due to the similarities in corporate 
governance between EU countries. Although La Porta et al (2001) report variation in 
corporate governance indicators across the EU, the Single Market Programme aimed 
to bring about a harmonisation of Western European laws including those relating to 
corporate governance (see La Porta et al. (2001, footnote 2). For the remaining 
countries in our sample, we treat them as a Rest of the World residual. 
 
Taken together, the paper considers the event period and long-run returns of UK 
acquiring firms. Having measured post-acquisition performance, the aim is to relate 
the distribution of these returns to the explanatory factors that have been highlighted 
in the finance and economics literature. We also segment our sample according to 
target country on the basis that variation in acquiring returns may exist according to 
differences in the nature of corporate governance. 
 
3. Data 
The sample is drawn from the set of all overseas acquisitions recorded by Amdata 
with bid values and sales of acquirer and target companies available.  In order to 
ensure that only economically significant deals are analysed, we use the cut-off that 
target sales must be at least 5% of acquirer’s sales in the financial year pre-
acquisition.  This necessarily requires data to be available on the target’s sales.  
Whilst this has the disadvantage of eliminating many (mainly non-US) takeovers, it 
 11
screens from the sample the many examples of takeovers of small and closely-held 
firms which may not be economically significant events.  We also require both an 
announcement date and a completion date to be available on Amdata.  These data 
requirements lead to an initial sample of 343 acquisitions. 
Table 1 here 
 
The method used to calculate post-bid abnormal returns imposes additional data 
requirements on this initial sample as we match acquiring firms by market 
capitalisation and by book-to-market ratio.  It is well known that these characteristics 
have an important role in explaining the cross-section of returns in both the US and 
the UK (e.g. Fama and French, 1992, 1996; Strong and Xu, 1997; Gregory, Harris and 
Michou, 2001).  To match on these characteristics, we require the market 
capitalisation of the firm from the London Business School Share Price Database 
(LSPD) and the book-to-market ratio to be available from Datastream.   In all, these 
data requirements result in a slightly reduced sample size for the long-run returns of 
333 firms. A summary of the characteristics of our sample of UK foreign acquisitions 
is provided in Table 1.  Note that we do not segregate our sample between cash and 
equity bids, as prior to the late 1990s foreign bids financed by equity were highly 
unusual events. 
 
4. Methodology 
(i) Event Period Returns 
In deriving the short-run returns around the event date we apply standard event study 
methodology. Specifically, we use cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to measure the 
takeover premia for acquiring firms where the daily stock return for company i is 
given by: 
itmtiiit RR ε+β+α=  
with the expected stock return being given by: 
mtiiit RRE β+α= ˆˆ)ˆ(  
The abnormal return (AR) for company i is given by: 
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                                      )( ititit RERAR −=                                       (1) 
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is therefore measured over an event window 
and is given by: 
                                                        (2) mtii
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−=
=
−=
ˆˆ
where ( , nt −= mt = ) is the size of the event window9. In deriving the CARs, 
expected returns are based on a 250-day window prior to the announcement of the 
foreign acquisition. We considered two event windows: a relatively short 5-day 
window (-3,1) and a longer event window (-10,10). 
 
(ii) Long-Run Returns 
Our first and main group of tests in deriving the long-run returns involves the use of  
buy-and-hold returns compared to reference portfolios of firms with similar size and 
similar market-to-book ratios.  We then undertake statistical inference tests using the 
bootstrapping approach of Ikenberry et al (1995) and Lyon et al, (op. cit.).  The 
motivation here is to avoid the biases in the more traditional CAR approach 
documented in Kothari and Warner (1997), although as Ikenberry et al (op. cit., p. 
188) note, the buy-and-hold approach also represents a more feasible investment 
strategy than that implied by the CAR model.  Briefly, the Ikenberry et al (op. cit.) 
method involves matching the returns on the portfolio of acquiring firms with a 
reference or control portfolio consisting of firms with similar size and book-to-market 
characteristics.  Statistical inference is made by generating an empirical distribution 
of long-run returns under the null hypothesis from this matched group.  This is done 
by randomly selecting a characteristic-matched firm for each acquiring firm and 
treating this matched firm as though it had announced an acquisition on the actual 
announcement date.  This portfolio of matched firms is termed a “pseudo-portfolio” 
by Ikenberry et al (op. cit., p. 189).  Long-run performance is then estimated for the 
pseudo-portfolio and the experiment is repeated 1,000 times, yielding 1,000 abnormal 
return observations and an empirical approximation of the distribution of these 
abnormal returns drawn under the null hypothesis. 
                                                          
9 We also repeated our tests using a simple market-adjusted return metric (equivalent to setting α=0 
and β=1).  The results were not materially different from those reported. 
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 For this analysis we form decile and quintile reference portfolios.  The ten size 
reference portfolios are formed using the year-end market capitalisation data from the 
London Business School Share Price Database (LSPD), the same source we use for 
company total returns. Each size reference portfolio is then partitioned into five book-
to-market quintiles using end-June book-to-market ratios from Datastream.  
Reference portfolios are then formed at the end of June each year and returns are 
calculated using the “buy-and-hold” method described in Lyon et al, (op. cit., p. 169): 
                 
( )
∑ ∏
=
+
=
−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +
= s
n
i s
s
st
it
bh
ps n
R
R
1
11
τ
τ                          (3) 
where τ is the period of investment in months, Rit is the return on security i in month t, 
and ns is the number of securities traded in month s, the first period for the return 
calculation.  This represents the return on a passive investment portfolio.  
 
We define the expected return on acquirer i,  [E(Riτ)] as the reference portfolio buy-
and-hold return given by (1).  Abnormal returns are then defined as: 
                     AR R E Ri i iτ τ= τ− ( )
                                                          
                                     (1') 
Returns are then calculated for up to 60 months post-completion. 
 
Given the well-documented biases in long-run return calculation, the test statistics we 
report are the bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic and pseudo-portfolio 
empirical p value methods outlined above and described in detail in Lyon et al (op. 
cit., pp 173-176).  We follow their method precisely, save for the fact we have 50 
portfolios (10 size x 5 book-to-market) as opposed to their 75 portfolios.10  The 
abnormal return on the pseudo-portfolio is then calculated from (1').  This procedure 
is then repeated 1000 times, yielding an empirical distribution of abnormal returns 
drawn under the null hypothesis.  We use this to estimate empirical p values for 10%, 
5% and 1% levels following Lyon et al (op. cit.).   These are then used to assess the 
significance of the sample of acquirer abnormal returns estimated from (1').   
10 Note that we use fewer portfolios principally because of the smaller number of stocks present on the 
UK stock exchange.   
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 Using the same notation as Lyon et al (op. cit.), we estimate the bootstrapped 
skewness-adjusted t-statistic as: 
                     ( ),ˆ61ˆ31 2 γγ nSSntsa ++=     (4) 
where: 
 ( )
n
AR
RAS
τ
τ
σ= , 
( )
( )31
3
ˆ
τ
ττ
σγ ARn
RAAR
n
i
i∑
=
−
= ,  
τRA  is the sample mean,  and ( )τσ AR is the cross-sectional sample standard deviation 
of abnormal returns.  The bootstrapping employed involves drawing 1000 
bootstrapped re-samples from the original sample of size nb = n/4.  In this choice of 
re-sampling size, we simply follow the recommendations of Lyon et al, but a 
discussion of alternative re-sampling sizes can be found in Lyon et al (op. cit., p. 
174).  For each re-sample, the analogue of (4) above is recalculated using the smaller 
sample, nb, in place of n. As for the pseudo-portfolio empirical tests, we calculate the 
two critical values of the distribution of the 1,000 re-samples for p  = 10%, 5%, and 
1%.   
 
We also calculate long-run CARs for our sample using the Fama-French three factor 
model, although we do not report them in detail.  We calculate these for two reasons: 
first, as a robustness check on the pseudo-portfolio approach; second,whilst CARs 
have their disadvantages, standardised CARs can be used in regression tests, which 
has the advantage of avoiding some problems relating to heteroscedasticity.  The 
CAR analysis leads to results that in general are qualitatively similar to those obtained 
from the pseudo-portfolio approach, though the CARs are less negative than the buy-
and-hold abnormal returns, as would be expected given the positive biases 
documented in Kothari and Warner (op. cit.).  
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5. Results 
(i) Short-Run Returns 
The results presented in Table 2 show the estimated CARs with an event window (-
3,1). For UK acquisitions as a whole, the CARs for UK acquiring firms are negative 
but not statistically significant. However, for US acquisitions short-run returns are 
positive but again not statistically significant. The CAR results for investment in other 
regions vary being negative for acquisitions in the EU and positive for those in the 
rest of the world but neither is statistically significant. Partitioning the sample of 
acquisitions according industry relatedness show that neither acquisitions in the same 
industry or conglomerate acquisitions generates statistically significant abnormal 
returns, our definition being based upon whether the two-digit SIC code of acquirer 
and target are coincident. Although the results presented in Table 2 relate to a 
relatively small window (-3,1), extending the CAR methodology to a larger window 
has no bearing on the overall results. Specifically, using a (-10,10) window, the only 
changes that occur are that the wealth gains for acquisitions in the US and for 
conglomerate acquisitions become negative but are not statistically significant in 
either case. Since no other results change, we do not present the results for the larger 
window. On the whole, our finding of insignificant negative returns contrasts with the 
event period findings of Eun et al (op.cit.), who find that UK acquirers perform worse 
than any other nationality in making US acquisitions while Cakici et al. (op. cit.) 
report positive returns for UK firms around the event date. 
 
Table 2 Here 
 
(ii) Long-Run Returns 
In Table 3 we present the overall results relating to long-run returns.  This table shows 
that the 1-year, 3-year and 5-year post acquisition returns for UK foreign acquirers are 
negative but not significantly different from zero11.  Following Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998), we report the abnormal returns for the sample by the book-to-market ratio.  
After 3 years, there does appear to be weak evidence of a “value” effect, with the high 
                                                          
11 The CARs for 12, 36 and 60 month periods are +1.2%, -0.1% and –4.8% respectively.  None of 
these CARs are statistically significant. 
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book-to-market (or “value” group) having positive returns, whilst the lowest returns 
are found in the low book-to-market (or “glamour” group).  These results are broadly 
in line with those of Rau and Vermaelen.  However, after 5 years there appears to be 
no monotonic relationship between the book-to-market ratio and acquirer 
performance. Although the high book-to-market group still have the highest overall 
abnormal returns after 5 years, the second largest abnormal return is associated with 
the low book-to-market group over this period, although only in the former group are 
abnormal return positive.  The overall impression from the 5-year returns is that 
abnormal returns are “U” shaped with respect to book-to-market groupings.  Although 
we report the two test statistics for each quintile, the small sample size in each 
quintile imposes quite demanding limits for any of the figures to be statistically 
significant.  Nonetheless, the fact that the median BTM quintile yields negative 
abnormal returns significant at the 10% level in both tests reinforces the impression of 
a “U” shaped distribution of abnormal returns.  This longer-horizon result stands in 
contrast to the results of Rau and Vermaelen, the relevant comparison being with the 
cash acquirers reported in their Table 6, Panel B, where they report that the abnormal 
returns to US cash-financed mergers12 for “glamour” acquirers was –11.5% after 36 
months, but for “value” acquirers the abnormal returns were +11.69% over the same 
period.  However, whilst Rau and Vermaelen partition their sample on a relative basis 
(i.e. the top 50% of acquirers by BTM are “value” firms), we partition on an absolute 
basis (i.e. on the basis of the BTM quintile to which the acquirer belongs).  It is 
noticeable that by this definition the majority of our acquirers would be “glamour” 
firms.   For our full sample it appears that there is little evidence to support a 
“performance extrapolation” hypothesis of bidder returns. 
 
Until very recently foreign takeovers by UK companies almost universally involved 
cash, cross-border equity transactions being an innovation that largely post dates our 
sample.  Most studies in the US and the UK document that domestic acquisitions 
financed by cash exhibit returns not significantly different from zero.13  Thus overall 
                                                          
12 Whilst the terminology differs in UK acquisitions, the vast majority of our sample are non-hostile 
bids, which roughly equates to a “merger” in US terminology; as noted, during our sample period it 
was extremely difficult for a UK company to acquire an overseas firm for anything other than cash. 
13 Although Gregory (1997) in a study of UK domestic acquirers for 1984-92 provides weak evidence 
that cash acquirers may under-perform, in that returns are just significantly negative under some 
benchmarks. 
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the pattern found for cross-border takeovers by UK companies is similar to that found 
in domestic acquisitions.  As above, we partition our data according to whether the 
takeover is of a US, non-UK EU or other (“Rest of the World”, RoW) domiciled 
company and partition the sample into conglomerate and non-conglomerate 
takeovers. All partitioned results are obtained by re-running the Lyon et al method for 
the relevant sub-sample. 
Table 3 about here 
 
The analysis by geographical region reported in Table 4 highlights the fact that mean 
US-target abnormal returns are a significantly negative 27.09% at the 1% level for the 
5 years post-takeover using both the bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-test and the p-
level from the empirical pseudo-portfolio distribution.  The 3-year post-takeover 
abnormal returns of –9.36% are significant at the 5% level using the former test, but 
only at the 10% level using the latter, whilst the 0.19% 1-year abnormal returns are 
not significant. Thus our analysis shows that the majority of the abnormal returns on 
acquisitions of US targets occur between months 36 and 60.14  In the case of 
acquisitions in the EU, the abnormal returns for the 5-year abnormal returns are 
insignificantly positive, whilst those for the 3 year and 1 year intervals post-takeover 
are insignificantly negative.  For the rest of the world, abnormal returns are positive 
and significantly so.  Given the small number of Rest of the World acquisitions (39 
cases) and their geographical spread, it is difficult to make any strong claims for the 
success or otherwise of these takeovers, but we find the 3-year and 5-year returns 
post-takeover are significant at the 5% and 10% levels for the two periods 
respectively.   
 
Table 4 here 
 
 The results from the partition of our acquirers’ long-run returns on the basis of 
whether they are in the same industry (same 2-digit SIC) or not are reported in Table 
5.  As might be expected, if synergistic benefits provide a motivation for takeovers, 
same industry acquirers perform significantly better than conglomerate acquirers.  
                                                          
14 This appears to be a critical factor in explaining the difference between our results and those of Conn 
et al (op. cit.) 
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Same-SIC code takeovers yield abnormal returns that are neither economically nor 
statistically significantly different from zero at 1-year, 3-year or 5-year horizons.   
These acquisitions yield returns of –2.3% after 1 year, -4% after 3 years, and –3.6% 
after 5 years.   By contrast, conglomerate acquisitions (defined as being takeovers in a 
firm with a different 2-digit SIC) yield modest negative abnormal returns over the 1 
and 3 year horizons, but a significant –21.8% after 5 years. 
 
Table 5 here 
 
Given the significant negative returns associated with US acquisitions, we further 
analyse these acquirers of US target returns by same SIC/ different SIC and by BTM 
quintile.  These results are reported in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 here 
 
Surprisingly, there is little difference between conglomerate and non-conglomerate 
groups in the US in terms of the absolute level of abnormal returns.  The same SIC 
group show abnormal returns of +2.7%, -11.1% and –29.6% over 1, 3 and 5 year 
horizons respectively, whilst the conglomerate group have abnormal returns of –4.5%, 
-6.3% and –22.5% over the same periods.  Although the same SIC group perform 
somewhat worse over the 5-year period, both are statistically significant and it seems 
probable that the difference in significance levels has more to do with the relative 
sample sizes (128 compared to 69) than the size of the abnormal returns. 
 
Turning to the returns by BTM quintile, no obvious pattern emerges from the 
analysis.   In line with the Rau and Vermaelen (op.cit.) results, the “glamour” group 
show the worst overall returns over both the 3-year (a significant-18.44%) and 5-year 
(a significant -45.2%).  However, the least poor performers are the BTM 2 group (-
9.8%) over 5-years, which would be classified as a “glamour” grouping. The other 
significant under-performers are the BTM 4 group which constitutes a “value” 
grouping.   
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Based on the analysis so far, it appears that the most robust fact is that British firms 
simply make poor US acquisitions when the long-run evidence is taken into account.  
This is not explained by either “performance extrapolation” factors, nor any theories 
connected with conglomerate versus non-conglomerate acquisitions. It may be that 
the differences in returns across countries/regions may reflect differences in corporate 
governance and/or the extent of competition in the market for corporate acquisitions. 
However, it is particularly notable that these long-run results represent a reversal of 
the event period results which were positive but statistically insignificant. The 
difference between these short and long-run results may also reflect differences in the 
factors that explain the distribution of abnormal returns in the firms that comprise our 
data set. We therefore turn to regression tests designed to tease out further insights 
into the factors that might explain the performance of UK acquirers of overseas 
targets. 
 
6. Regression Tests 
As noted in the section 1, there are two broad themes in the literature that have been 
used to examine the determinants of returns to acquiring firms following foreign 
acquisitions. The first relates to the internalisation or exploitation of monopoly rents 
hypotheses that predict that a firm’s ability to derive abnormal profits through 
takeover should stem from its “knowledge asset” base (Dunning, (op.cit.) and Morck 
and Yeung, (op.cit.)) reflected in the ownership of intangible assets, whether the 
acquirer already had a presence in the target market (Harris and Ravenscraft, (op.cit.)) 
and the degree of industry relatedness.  While the firm and industry-specific 
determinants of acquirers' returns should be informative about the distribution of 
returns over a cross-section of firms, there are further issues to be considered in terms 
of the timing of the acquisition decision. This is the second theme in the finance 
literature that has focussed on macro-economic determinants particularly the 
importance of the exchange rate and the impact of US tax policy reforms with respect 
to acquisitions in the US.  
 
To test these hypotheses, we ran regression tests with event period (short-run) 
abnormal returns as well as the long-run abnormal returns over the 5-year period as 
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dependent variables. A potential problem with using untransformed abnormal returns 
in regression tests is that of heteroscedasticity.  Most papers that undertake regression 
tests to investigate the distribution of abnormal returns use either standardised CARs 
as the dependent variable or adopt a weighted least squares approach.  We follow this 
well-established model of using standardised CARs for the regressions of short-run 
returns, but this does raise the issue of how to treat the regressions of long-run 
returns.  Controlling for heteroscedasticity using weighted least-squares, with weights 
being the inverse of the standard prediction error, or standardising CARs using the 
same prediction error, is not possible when using the pseudo-portfolio method is used 
to estimate abnormal returns, so for our regression tests we re-estimate the abnormal 
returns using the Fama-French three-factor model estimated over the 60 months post-
takeover.  The standardised CARs from this model are used in the regression tests 
described below.15
 
In each case, we included the following independent variables which relate to the 
various hypotheses relating to the foreign acquisition literature as discussed above: 
US = dummy variable equal to one if the acquisition is made in the US  
EU = dummy variable equal to one if the acquisition is made in the EU 
USTAX = dummy variable equal to one if the takeover was of a US company 
and occurred prior to the introduction of the 1986 Tax Reform Act  
EXCHRATE=the US$/£ rate for takeovers in the US and ROW, or the DM/£ 
rate for acquisitions in the EU matched to the deal announcement date. This 
variable was used in the regressions relating to the short-run (event period) 
CARs. For the long-run returns, we used DCURR (see below) 
DCURR5 = the change in the $/£ rate for takeovers in the US and ROW, or the 
DM/£ rate for takeovers in the EU, measured over 5 years post takeover16
R&D INT = the industry R&D as a percentage of sales (see below) 
ADV INT = the industry advertising expenditure as a percentage of sales (see 
below) 
                                                          
15 We also estimated the regression tests using the untransformed abnormal returns from the Lyon et al 
procedure described above.  The results are generally similar, but considerably weaker with lower R-
squared statistics.  A copy of these results is available from the authors on request. 
16 We tried alternative measures of the exchange rate variable including real and nominal. There was 
little difference between them. The results reported relate to changes in the nominal exchange rate. 
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SAME SIC = dummy variable equal to one if the acquisition is made in an 
industry with the same 2-digit SIC code 
HOSTILE = dummy variable equal to one if the acquisition was a hostile bid 
FORSALES=sales in the target region by acquiring firm in the year prior to 
acquisition. 
 
The first two variables segment the data by geographical region. As discussed in 
section 1, the US has a similar corporate governance structure to that of the UK while 
the EU has notable differences. Nevertheless, EU countries are treated as a single unit 
reflect the harmonisation of corporate governance standards following the Single 
Market Programme. These variables control for the results reported in the previous 
section that returns in the short and long-run can vary by geographical region. Given 
that the US also accounts for the bulk of the acquisitions in our sample, we also run 
separate regressions on the US data alone.  
 
The next three variables reflect the role of macroeconomic factors in determining 
acquisitions, specifically the role of the exchange rate and US tax reforms. If a 
depreciating currency overcomes capital market constraints (as suggested by Froot 
and Stein (op. cit.)) and US tax laws were biased in favour of domestic acquisitions 
prior to the 1986 Tax Reform Act (as suggested by Scholes and Wolfson (op. cit.)), 
we would expect these variables to have a negative sign.  
 
R&D INT is intended to capture the ownership of firm-specific intangible assets and 
the role of internalisation which forms the basis of the OLI framework for explaining 
FDI as discussed in section 1. Reflecting the view that intangible assets may also be 
reflected in the nature of the product, we also include advertising expenditure as an 
indicator of intangible assets. Ideally, we would measure firm-specific R&D and 
advertising expenditure.  Unfortunately, such an analysis of the current sample is not 
possible as disclosure of R&D expenditure only became mandatory in the UK for 
accounting periods beginning on or after 1st January 1989 (SSAP 13, revised), and 
unlike US GAAP, there is no requirement for UK firms to disclose expenditures on 
direct selling costs or advertising expenditures.  Consequently, we have to rely on 
industry estimates.  Preferably, we would use these for relevant years in our sample, 
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but manufacturing industry figures for R&D intensity (R&D as a percentage of sales) 
are only available from the Office of National Statistics from 1993 on.17  We choose 
to use the final year of our sample period (1994) as a consequence, although in 
practice there appears to be little year-to-year variability in the industry level R&D 
intensity.  At present, no such data is produced for service industries, and to measure 
R&D intensity here we constructed R&D/Sales for each industry using Datastream 
data. At present, no such data is produced for service industries.  Advertising 
expenditure is more problematic, and only recently has any attempt been made to 
produce systematically researched data on UK advertising expenditure by industry as 
a percentage of sales.  This data is only available from 1999 onwards and can be 
found in Paton and Conant (2000).  We use these 1999 industry level advertising 
intensity measures as the proxy measure for advertising expenditure in our sample. If 
the internalisation hypothesis for FDI is to be substantiated, we would expect the 
R&D and advertising intensity variables either independently or jointly to be 
statistically significant positive effect. 
 
The final three variables are those that have been used to explain the distribution of 
abnormal returns in previous studies. To capture industry relatedness, we have a 
dummy variable reflecting whether the acquiring and target firm’s main activity was 
in the same SIC. This data was available from Amdata. On the assumption that 
synergy may be important in value-enhancing acquisitions, we would expect this 
variable to have a positive impact on abnormal returns. HOSTILE notes whether the 
acquisition was subject to a hostile bid. This variable is included given the empirical 
evidence that “friendly” bids sometimes under-perform hostile bids (for a review of 
the relevant literature, see Agrawal and Jaffe, op. cit.).  This variable therefore is 
expected to be positive. Finally, FORSALES represents the presence of the acquiring 
firm in the year prior to the acquisition. This is measured as the level of sales in the 
target country as a proportion of total sales of the acquiring firm. This variable was 
constructed using Datastream and the Multinational Yearbook18. Reflecting the 
                                                          
17 Source: National Statistics.  The authors are indebted to Jane Morgan of the Office for National 
Statistics, Cardiff, Wales, for her help in obtaining this data. 
18 Data could not be obtained for all firms in our data set. We therefore report the results for the full 
sample without this variable and with the smaller sample where we could retrieve data for this variable. 
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previous literature on this issue (see discussion in section 1), the expected sign is 
negative. 
 
We report the results for the event period returns for the full sample and then for the 
US sample separately with and without the FORSALES variable which, as noted 
above, not all data was available. We also do the same for the returns after 5 years.  
The results for the announcement period returns for all UK foreign acquisitions and 
for acquisitions in the US only are reported in Table 7. Consider, first of all, the 
results for the full sample excluding the FORSALES variable. The only variables that 
are statistically significant are the control dummy for acquisitions in the EU and the 
macroeconomic variables reflecting the exchange rate and US tax reforms. The 
negative sign on the EU dummy suggests lower abnormal returns relative to the Rest  
of the World though this is significant at only the 10 per cent level and becomes 
insignificant once the FORSALES variable is included. The role of macroeconomic 
factors tend to be the most important determinants of event period returns. The 
exchange rate has the expected negative sign and is significant at the 10 per cent 
level. However, when the FORSALES variable is included (column 3), the role of the 
exchange rate becomes statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. The role of US 
tax reforms also appears to be important being significant at the 5 per cent level in the 
full sample the negative sign being consistent with a priori expectations though it 
becomes insignificant in the smaller sample of firms. The role of factors reflecting the 
internalisation hypothesis have the correct signs but are not statistically significant as 
are the variables reflecting industry relatedness and the presence of hostile bidders. 
Industry relatedness does not appear to play a role in determining the short-run CAR 
results and neither does the existence of a hostile bidder.  Compatible with the 
Doukas and Travlos (op. cit.) findings, FORSALES has a negative and significant 
coefficient.   
 
Focussing on the US sample only, we find that the results are more or less identical 
with the exchange rate playing a more significant role being statistically significant at 
the 5 per cent level (see column 2) but being significant at the 1 per cent level when 
the FORSALES variable is included (column 4). US tax reform also remains important 
being significant at the 5 and 1 per cent levels respectively with and without the 
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inclusion of the FORSALES variable. The results for the US sample also suggest some 
justification for the internalisation hypothesis, though in terms of advertising intensity 
rather than in the form of the R&D variable. The presence of the firm in the acquiring 
market (FORSALES) has the correct sign but is statistically significant at only the 10 
per cent level. The inclusion of this variable is also important in that it improves the 
explanatory power of the regressions as a whole, in the case of the US sample 
increasing the adjusted R2 from 2 per cent to over 8 per cent. 
 
Taken together, the results suggest that the role of macroeconomic factors appear to 
be the principal determinants of event period returns. This is consistent with other 
studies of cross-border acquisitions of Swanson (op. cit.) and Dewenter (op. cit.) and 
the theoretical work of Froot and Stein (op. cit.) and Scholes and Wolfson (op. cit.). 
The role of factors consistent with the traditional theory of FDI have only a limited 
role while factors commonly referred to in the finance literature have no significant 
effect with the exception of the variable reflecting presence in the target market. 
 
Table 7 here 
 
The results of the regressions of 5-year abnormal returns are reported in Table 8.  
Referring to the full sample first of all (columns 1 and 3), it should be noted that the 
role of the exchange rate and the tax reform variables stand in marked contrast to the 
event period returns as neither of these variables are statistically significant at 
acceptable levels. This is true whether we consider the larger sample excluding the 
FORSALES variable or the smaller sample with its inclusion. Note however the role 
of the R&D variable, this variable being statistically significant at the 1 per cent level 
in both the larger and smaller samples. When the FORSALES variable is included, this 
variable is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level and has the expected negative 
sign while the variable reflecting a hostile bid is significant at the 1 per cent level and 
has the anticipated sign. Note also that the overall explanatory power of the regression 
increases following the inclusion of the FORSALES variable. 
 
The US sample reinforces these results. The exchange rate is of no importance with 
only weak evidence for the role of the tax policy reforms. The internalisation 
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hypothesis continues to receive strong support with the R&D variable continuing to 
be highly significant, as is the advertising intensity variable when the FORSALES 
variable is included. Although this variable is not statistically significant in the US 
sample, its inclusion leads to the impact of a hostile bid having a positive effect on 
long-run returns which is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Note also that 
the adjusted R2 increases to around 20 per cent in the FORSALES included sample. 
 
Table 8 here 
 
The significance of the results reported in tables 7 and 8 is that the factors that 
determine the distribution of abnormal returns appear to change as we move from the 
event period returns to returns 5 years post-acquisition. Specifically, the role of 
ownership factors such as R&D which have played a prominent role in the FDI 
literature have, at the very most, only limited explanatory power in determining the 
event period returns of UK acquiring firms. Rather, the role of short-term 
macroeconomic and policy factors such as the exchange rate and tax reforms have a 
dominating influence. In contrast, in considering the returns 5 years post-acquisition, 
these factors diminish in their importance in determining the distribution of returns. 
However, unlike the event period sample, the role of factors reflecting the 
internalisation hypothesis become the most important influences. As such, the 
significance of these results would appear to suggest that the market inappropriately 
values cross-border acquisitions in the short-run with those firms doing well in the 
longer-run being those with a strong intangible asset (mainly R&D) base, consistent 
with the traditional literature on FDI. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The back-drop to this paper has been the dramatic surge in FDI that has occurred in 
the world economy since the mid-1980s and has involved, in the main, cross-border 
acquisitions. The specific aim of this paper has been to consider the performance of 
acquiring firms from the event date through to the end of a 5-year period. Using a 
near-exhaustive sample of significant UK acquisitions abroad the results indicate 
significant negative abnormal returns to firms acquiring in the US, returns to firms 
acquiring in the EU being not significantly different from zero, whilst those relatively 
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few takeovers in the rest of the world appear to exhibit performance which is positive 
and statistically significant. The results further indicate that investing in a related 
industry also has a negative impact on the returns achieved. Returns to acquirers do 
not appear to be explained to any significant degree by “glamour” versus “value” firm 
effects.  These results differ from abnormal returns estimated around the event date 
that has been the focus on previous literature on foreign acquisitions. On the whole, 
the results for the full sample, irrespective of any specific country or region, show that 
returns around the event date are not statistically significant from zero. The reversal in 
fortune for UK firms acquiring targets in the US is one of the key results in this paper 
and reflects that geographical variation in returns may reflect similarities or 
differences in legal and corporate governance standards throughout the world. 
Alternatively, given the similarity in corporate governance between the UK and US, 
the negative returns in the US may reflect the intensity of short-run competition for 
US targets due to the depreciating dollar and US tax reforms that lead to a significant 
increase in foreign acquisitions, but that these short-run factors did not fully disclose 
value-creating acquisitions that would only become apparent in the longer-run. 
 
We have explored the possible reasons for explaining the variation in the performance 
of UK acquirers over both the sort and long-run. The most interesting results relate to 
the observation that the factors that appear to determine the distribution of event 
period returns differ from those that determine returns after 5 years. Specifically, the 
role of the exchange rate and US tax reforms have an important role in determining 
event period returns though these factors have at most a limited impact in explaining 
returns 5 years post-acquisition. In contrast, while R&D plays no statistically 
significant role in the short-run, it becomes the most important factor explaining 
longer run returns. The latter result is entirely consistent with the internalisation 
hypothesis. Reflecting the difference between the event period and longer run 
abnormal returns, the factors that determine the returns over this longer-run period are 
markedly different from those determining event period returns. The implication of 
this is that acquiring firms with specific advantages will likely return a stronger post-
acquisition performance even if event period, time-specific determining factors 
dissipate over the longer-run. In sum, these results generate some sources of concern 
in the way that markets value cross-border acquisitions with commensurate 
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implications for shareholder wealth in that long-run returns can differ from 
announcement period returns as can the factors which seem to be important in 
determining longer run returns. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Sample of UK Foreign Acquisitions: 1984-1995 
 
 
 
Year Acquisitions in: US EU Rest of World Same Industry Conglomerate 
Acquisitions 
1984      4 0 0 2 2 
1985       4 1 0 4 1
1986       27 1 0 20 8
1987       25 3 3 19 12
1988       39 16 7 42 20
1989       26 8 5 23 16
1990       20 15 1 24 12
1991       12 9 5 20 6
1992       11 11 3 18 7
1993       20 14 7 27 14
1994 
 
     18 20 8 37 9
Total       206 98 39 238 105
 
Source of sample data is Amdata. Note that the data for 1984 is from October 1984 onwards.  
Same industry acquisitions was defined according to acquisitions within the same Standard Industrial 
Trade Classification at the 2 digit level. All other acquisitions were regarded as conglomerate acquisitions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:Short-run CAR Results for UK Acquiring Firms 
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  All Countries US Acquisitions EU Acquisitions   RoW Acquisitions All Countries:
Same SIC 
All Countries: 
Conglomerate 
Average CAR -0.00022     0.002372 -0.00719 0.002026 -0.00134 0.00168 
Standard Deviation 0.06001      0.062565 0.062173 0.036879 0.064688 0.048698
T-test -0.068328      0.544091 -1.14431 0.343049 -0.31848 0.356902
Sample Size 333      206 98 39 236 107
 
The CAR results are the cumulative abnormal returns of the acquirer's stock price over a (-3,1) event window around the announcement date. 
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Table 3: Overall results for foreign acquisitions by UK companies.  Figures shown are the abnormal returns for 1-year, 3-year and 5-year post acquisition returns 
together with the Lyon et al (1999) bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic, critical values of the statistic based upon its empirical distribution from bootstrapped 
resamples, and empirical p values for the from the distribution of sample means from Lyon et al style pseudo-portfolios.  Significant observations at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels for both tests are shown by ***, ** and * respectively, whilst ns denotes the observed abnormal returns are not significantly different from zero.  The last two rows in 
the table show the breakdown of the observations by book-to-market quintile, with the significance level shown respectively for the bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-
statistic, and the empirical p values from the pseudo-portfolios. 
 
Years post takeover 
Abnormal 
return 
Bootstrapped 
skewness-
adjusted t-
statistic 
Critical 
value for 
10% 
significance
Critical 
value for 
5% 
significance 
Critical 
value for 
1% 
significance
Significance 
of 
bootstrapped 
skewness-
adjusted t-
statistic 
Pseudo-
portfolio 
critical 
value for 
10% 
significance
Pseudo-
portfolio 
critical 
value for 
5% 
significance
Pseudo-
portfolio 
critical 
value for 
1% 
significance
Significance 
from 
empirical 
pseudo 
portfolio 
distribution 
1 year abnormal return 0.0065 0.4619 -1.3696 -1.6365 -2.1770 ns -0.0306 -0.0352 -0.0442 ns 
3 year abnormal return -0.0390 -1.0612 -1.5280 -1.9562 -2.5132 ns -0.0610 -0.0728 -0.0910 ns 
5 year abnormal return -0.0929 -0.6127 -2.1705 -2.5671 -3.4359 ns -0.1058 -0.1189 -0.1551 ns 
Breakdown of 5-year returns by BTM 
quintile: 
 Low BTM BTM2 BTM3 BTM4 High BTM
1 year abnormal return 0.0207
ns,ns
-0.0210
ns,ns
-0.0141
ns,ns
0.0370 
ns,ns 
0.0428
ns,ns
3 year abnormal return -0.1035
ns,ns
-0.0375
ns,ns
-0.0436
ns,ns
-0.0078 
ns,ns 
0.1670
ns,ns
5 year abnormal return -0.0144
ns,ns
-0.1069
ns,ns
-0.1838
*,*
-0.1900 
ns,ns 
0.1131
ns,ns
Number of observations 99 87 71 52 24
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Table 4: Abnormal returns for foreign acquisitions by UK companies by region.  Figures shown are the abnormal returns for 1-year, 3-year and 5-year post acquisition 
returns together with the Lyon et al (1999) bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic, critical values of the statistic based upon its empirical distribution from bootstrapped 
resamples, and empirical p values for the from the distribution of sample means from Lyon et al style pseudo-portfolios.  Significant observations at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels for both tests are shown by ***, ** and * respectively, whilst ns denotes the observed abnormal returns are not significantly different from zero.   
 
Years post 
takeover 
Abnormal 
return 
Bootstrapped 
skewness-adjusted 
t-statistic 
Critical value 
for 10% 
significance 
Critical value 
for 5% 
significance 
Critical value 
for 1% 
significance 
Significance of 
bootstrapped 
skewness-
adjusted t-
statistic 
Pseudo-
portfolio 
critical value 
for 10% 
significance 
Pseudo-
portfolio 
critical value 
for 5% 
significance 
Pseudo-
portfolio 
critical value 
for 1% 
significance 
Significance 
from empirical 
pseudo 
portfolio 
distribution 
US results n=197          
1 year abnormal 
return 0.0019 0.1148 -1.5368 -1.9075 -2.5738ns  -0.0367 -0.0431 -0.0548ns
3 year abnormal 
return -0.0936 -2.2464 -1.6109 -2.0280 -2.5307**  -0.0783 -0.0944 -0.1146*
5 year abnormal 
return -0.2709 -4.0544 -1.5099 -1.7187 -2.2834***  -0.1157 -0.1375 -0.1886***
EU results n=97          
1 year abnormal 
return -0.0035 -0.1193 -1.6480 -2.0312 -2.9813ns  -0.0492 -0.0572 -0.0748ns
3 year abnormal 
return -0.0296 -0.3589 -1.6384 -1.9119 -2.4518ns  -0.1134 -0.1308 -0.1735ns
5 year abnormal 
return 0.1020 0.4861 -3.0443 -3.4276 -4.2410ns  -0.2123 -0.2359 -0.2990ns
ROW results n=39          
1 year abnormal 
return 0.054744 1.203149 -1.5987 -1.84908 -2.47839ns  -0.06765 -0.07839 -0.09263ns
3 year abnormal 
return 0.213079 2.035417 -2.0383 -2.69034 -3.57181**positive -0.14794 -0.18165 -0.23845**positive 
5 year abnormal 
return 0.321452 1.412187 -2.51806 -3.50777 -5.64105*positive -0.25607 -0.31374 -0.38622*positive 
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Table 5: Abnormal returns for foreign acquisitions by UK companies by 2-digit SIC diversity of acquisition.  Figures shown are the abnormal returns for 1-year, 3-
year and 5-year post acquisition returns together with the Lyon et al (1999) bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic, critical values of the statistic based upon its empirical 
distribution from bootstrapped resamples, and empirical p values for the from the distribution of sample means from Lyon et al style pseudo-portfolios.  Significant 
observations at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for both tests are shown by ***, ** and * respectively, whilst ns denotes the observed abnormal returns are not significantly 
different from zero.   
 
Years post takeover 
Abnormal 
return 
Bootstrapped 
skewness-
adjusted t-
statistic 
Critical value 
for 10% 
significance 
Critical value 
for 5% 
significance 
Critical value 
for 1% 
significance 
Significance of 
bootstrapped 
skewness-
adjusted t-
statistic 
Pseudo-
portfolio 
critical value 
for 10% 
significance 
Pseudo-
portfolio 
critical value 
for 5% 
significance 
Pseudo-
portfolio 
critical value 
for 1% 
significance 
Significance 
from empirical 
pseudo 
portfolio 
distribution 
Same SIC  n=229          
1 year abnormal return 0.022976 1.317197 -1.41283 -1.6551 -2.18138ns -0.03349 -0.0403 -0.05785ns 
3 year abnormal return -0.04048 -0.86107 -1.67213 -2.10007 -2.7313ns -0.07771 -0.09015 -0.11473ns 
5 year abnormal return -0.03589 -0.11376 -2.55749 -2.9928 -3.77766ns -0.12334 -0.1493 -0.19534ns 
Diff SIC  n=104          
1 year abnormal return -0.02967 -1.24796 -1.66624 -2.00867 -2.63083ns -0.04975 -0.05686 -0.06899ns 
3 year abnormal return -0.03588 -0.61579 -1.65052 -1.91585 -2.5706ns -0.09231 -0.10804 -0.12984ns 
5 year abnormal return -0.21849 -2.34291 -1.50655 -1.80751 -2.69736** -0.16 -0.18655 -0.23044** 
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Table 6: Abnormal returns for US acquisitions by UK companies by 2-digit SIC diversity of acquisition and BTM quintile.  Figures shown are the abnormal returns 
for 1-year, 3-year and 5-year post acquisition returns together with the Lyon et al (1999) bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic, critical values of the statistic based upon 
its empirical distribution from bootstrapped resamples, and empirical p values for the from the distribution of sample means from Lyon et al style pseudo-portfolios.  
Significant observations at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for both tests are shown by ***, ** and * respectively, whilst ns denotes the observed abnormal returns are not 
significantly different from zero. The last two rows in the table show the breakdown of the observations by book-to-market quintile, with the significance level shown 
respectively for the bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic, and the empirical p values from the pseudo-portfolios. 
Years post takeover 
Abnormal 
return 
Bootstrapped 
skewness-
adjusted t-
statistic 
Critical 
value for 
10% 
significance
Critical 
value for 5% 
significance
Critical 
value for 1% 
significance
Significance 
of 
bootstrapped 
skewness-
adjusted t-
statistic 
Pseudo-
portfolio 
critical value 
for 10% 
significance
Pseudo-
portfolio 
critical value
for 5% 
significance
 
Pseudo-
portfolio 
critical value
for 1% 
significance
 
Significance 
from 
empirical 
pseudo 
portfolio 
distribution 
Same SIC  n=128          
1 year abnormal return 0.026707 1.266533 -1.44009 -1.84985 -2.48045ns -0.05079 -0.05738 -0.06598ns 
3 year abnormal return -0.11016 -2.21619 -1.46589 -1.66224 -2.29607** -0.0942 -0.10586 -0.12439** 
5 year abnormal return -0.29571 -3.62854 -1.52596 -1.95725 -2.53479*** -0.1691 -0.19006 -0.25815*** 
Diff SIC   n=69        
1 year abnormal return -0.04408 -1.45588 -1.6892 -2.00878 -2.67874ns -0.05325 -0.06045 -0.07578ns 
3 year abnormal return -0.06295 -0.83608 -1.7787 -2.18104 -3.66527ns -0.11251 -0.13416 -0.15826ns 
5 year abnormal return -0.22495 -1.93632 -1.8948 -2.26695 -3.30803* -0.18286 -0.20624 -0.27108** 
Breakdown of 5-year returns by BTM 
quintile: 
 Low BTM BTM2    BTM3 BTM4 High BTM
1 year abnormal return 
 
-0.0027
ns,ns
-0.0213
ns,ns
0.0148
ns,ns
0.0386
ns,ns
-0.0465
ns,ns
3 year abnormal return 
 
-0.1844
**,*
-0.0833
ns,ns
-0.0042
ns,ns
-0.0439
ns,ns
-0.1217
ns,ns
5 year abnormal return 
 
-0.4523
***,****
-0.0976
ns,ns
-0.1294
ns,ns
-0.3561
**,**
-0.2583
ns,ns
Number of observations 64 48 43 34 8
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Table 7. Regression Tests of Determinants of Event Period Returns 
Dependent variables are the standardised event period CARs. For an explanation of the independent 
variables see text.  The figures in italics under the coefficients are p-values from a two-tailed test 
 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
FULL 
SAMPLE 
US SAMPLE FULL 
SAMPLE 
US SAMPLE 
CONSTANT 0.594 -0.1005 1.0419 0.0238 
 
 
(0.8401) (-0.1510) (1.069) (0.0198) 
US -0.253  -0.2686  
 
 
(-0.3663)  (-0.2944)  
EU -1.0621***  -1.1409  
 
 
(-1.657)  (-1.397)  
EXRATE -6.2425*** -13.873** -9.4942** -24.437*
 
 
(-1.876) (-2.185) (-2.049) (-2.652) 
US TAX -2.4414** -3.6168* -2.7242 -4.7768**
 
 
(-2.366) (-2.778) (-1.284) (-1.997) 
R&D INT 0.0388 0.02557 0.0594 0.0725 
 
 
(1.053) (0.5823) (1.344) (1.233) 
ADV INT 0.288 0.7083*** 0.3998 1.1904**
 
 
(0.9913) (1.745) (1.016) (1.991) 
SAME SIC -0.5389 -0.3489 -0.9634 -1.965 
 
 
(-1.102) (-0.5103) (-1.449) (-1-131) 
HOSTILE -0.5069 -0.1313 0.7931 2.026 
 
 
(-0.3877) (-0.1016) (0.4751) (1.162) 
FOR.SALES   -3.145** -3.6095***
 
 
  (-2.003) (-1.698) 
ADJUSTED R2 0.0119 0.0365 0.0207 0.0853 
SAMPLE  SIZE 328 193 224 124 
Numbers in parantheses are t-statistics. * represents significance at the 1 per cent level, ** represents significance 
at the 5 per cent level and *** represents significance at the 10 per cent level. 
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Table 8. Regression Tests of Determinants of Long-Run Returns 
Dependent variables are the 60-month standardised CARs from the Fama-French 3-factor model. For 
an explanation of the independent variables see text.  The figures in italics under the coefficients are p-
values from a two-tailed test 
 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
FULL 
SAMPLE 
US SAMPLE FULL 
SAMPLE 
US SAMPLE 
CONSTANT 0.10388 -0.0951 0.2948 -0.5521* 
 
 
(0.4248) (-0.5263) (1.003) (-2.84) 
US -0.1373  -0.3172  
 
 
(-0.6497)  (-1.350)  
EU -0.1056  -0.2423  
 
 
(-0.4500)  (-0.9098)  
SAME SIC -0.0341 -0.0409 0.0504 -0-.6747 
 
 
(-0.2662) (-0.277) (0.3376) (-0.4146) 
EXRATE 0.4394 -0.2844 0.6053 -0.3066 
 
 
(1.090) (-0.5697) (1.232) (-0.4209) 
US TAX -0.063 0.1795 0.1853 0.6043*** 
 
 
(-0.2874) (0.779) (0.6424) (1.724) 
R&D INT 0.03468* 0.0397* 0.038* 0.05802* 
 
 
(4.977) (4.724) (5.009) (8.276) 
ADV INT -0.029 0.0326 0.0387 0.293* 
 
 
(-0.3953) (0.4009) (0.4483) (3.613) 
HOSTILE 0.46435 0.4504 0.8849* 0.9142* 
 
 
(1.49) (1.427) (4.188) (5.617) 
FOR.SALES   -0.8527** -0.0814 
 
 
  (-2.166) (-0.2088) 
ADJUSTED R2 0.0125 0.0343 0.0493 0.2028 
SAMPLE  SIZE 317 185 220 120 
Numbers in parantheses are p-values. * represents significance at the 1 per cent level, ** represents significance at 
the 5 per cent level and *** represents significance at the 10 per cent level. 
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